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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 07/07/2011 Accident number: 715 
Accident time: 15:30 Accident Date: 25/07/2007 
Where it occurred: CBU 771, Nr Majdal 
Selim, Demining group 
HQ, Kudmouse, Tyre 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 01/08/2007 
ID original source: 012/2007 Name of source: UN MACC SL 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Submunitions and 
explosive 
Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 07/07/2011 
No of victims: 0 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inconsistent statements (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in February 2008 as a collection of files. Its 
conversion to a DDAS file  means that some of the original formatting has been lost. The 
substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original files are held 
on record. Text in [ ] is editorial. 
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INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 012/07, FOR ARMOR GROUP ([Demining 
Group]) INCIDENT AT [Demining Group] HEADQUARTERS, KADMOUSE  25th July 2007 
1.  BACKGROUND 
Date: 25th July 2007 
Time of Incident: 1530hrs approx. 
Location: [Demining Group], HQ, Kadmouse, Tyre, Lebanon 
Task: N/A 
UTM of Task: N/A  
Task Start / Finish Date: N/A 
Organisation Involved: [Demining group]  
Unit: N/A  
Supervisor: N/A 
Reported by: [Name removed], Ops Officer, [Demining group] 
Reported to: [Name removed], Ops Officer, MACC SL 
Time of Incident report to MACC QA: 1545hrs approx. 
Organisation POC: [Name removed], Ops Officer, [Demining Group]. 
Investigation Date/Time: 25th July and 8th August 07. 
Investigation Location: [Demining group], HQ,  
Investigation Team: Lt [Name removed], LAF/LMAC Ops Officer, [Name removed], MACC SL 
C of QA. 
ERW Type: TNT bulk explosive (approx. 5-8kgs+)  
Accreditation Details: N/A 
2.  DETAILS OF INCIDENT 
On the 25th Jul 07 at approximately 1545hrs [Demining Group] reported to the MACC that 
they had located an amount of bulk explosive, 5-8kgs, at their HQ in Kudmose, Tyre. The 
explosive was located after a driver discarded a cigarette into tree/bushes adjacent to the 
[Demining Group] HQ office entrance. See photos at Annex B. A fire was initiated by the 
discarded cigarette, once the fire was extinguished an amount of explosive was then 
identified and located. This totalled approx. 5-7kg in weight.  
[Name removed], [Demining Group] Ops Officer reported the incident to [Name removed], 
MACC Ops Officer and [Name removed], MACC SL C of QA.  
At approx. 1630hrs on the 25th July 2007, the MACC SL investigation team, comprising Lt 
[Name removed], LAF Ops Officer and [Name removed], along with [Name removed], 
departed for [Demining Group] HQ.  After arriving at the [Demining Group] office the MACC 
SL investigation team was briefed by [Name removed] and examined the explosives and the 
area where the items where located.  
Evidence 
The area of the fire and the location of the explosives are adjacent to the right side of the 
[Demining Group] HQ building in a garden area. The area forms part of a garden and lawn 
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area. A tree indicated the fire location and there were large and small portion of the explosive 
still remaining on the surface area totalling approx. 5-7kgs. 
Interview with [Demining Group] [Name removed] 
See Annex D for a summary of the statements taken from all [Demining Group] team four (4) 
searchers on the 30th Jul 2007. [Annex D was not made available.] In attendance was [Name 
removed], [Demining Group] Ops Manager, Capt [Name removed] and [Name removed] C of 
QA. In summary there was some confusion amongst the searchers as to what type of 
clearance occurred on this specific area. Indications from the searchers of what clearance 
was conducted at this area of the site are:  no clearance to sub-surface clearance occurred in 
this area. At the request of [Name removed] all personnel [Demining Group] team 4, [Name 
removed, demining group supervisor] and the BOI deployed to the site for a final assessment 
to confirm what occurred.  
During this site visit all searchers were interviewed separately at the area in question.  All 
searchers confirmed that the area was cleared in approx. 30-90 minutes, this included site 
marking and sub surface search of the area. In addition that [demining group supervisor] was 
in a hurry to leave the site and they had been told to search the area very quickly. This was 
confirmed by a review of the daily work sheets. See Annex D for full details of the daily work 
sheets. [Annexes were not made available.] 
Interview with [demining group supervisor] 
[Demining group supervisor] was interviewed on the 30/31 Jul 2007. During the interview on 
the 30th Jul 07, it was confirmed by [demining group supervisor] that area had been cleared 
sub surface by [Demining Group] team 4 and that he could not explain why they had missed 
the two items.  A follow up interview was conducted on the 31st Jul, additional personnel, 
[demining group supervisor] and Lt Col [demining group supervisor], LAF, LMAC were in 
attendance. During this interview [demining group supervisor] confirmed that although the 
area was sub surface searched, the procedure and clearance method were not in accordance 
with [Demining Group] SOPs and further he was in a hurry to vacant the site as he had 
worked in this area for 6 months or more.  He also confirmed he spent no more than 1-3 
hours clearing this portion of the site.  
Interview with [Name removed], UN MACC SL Ops 
[Name removed] confirmed that he had visited the site on a number of occasions and that 
during these visit discussion, with [demining group supervisor] had occurred regarding the 
clearance of the site, and the need to clear this particular area of the site. The area in 
question had not been cleared as had been directed by [Name removed]. During a final 
operational visit which was requested by [demining group supervisor] the need to clear this 
area to fade was again stressed and the area was then programmed for clearance.   
Background 
CBU 771 is located within a mixture of residential houses and agriculture land, the land being 
farmed for wheat. The CBU is located near Majdal Selim.  
[Demining Group] commenced BAC operations at CBU 771 on 5th Feb 07 and between this 
date and the 20th Mar 07, surface and sub surface clearance was conducted. The task was 
internal suspend from the 6th Feb until the 13th Mar 07 when it was restarted and again 
thought completed on the 20th Mar 07.  However due to additional information on the extend 
of the strike area, additional clearance was required at the site and this commenced 13th Jun 
07 and was completed on the 22nd Jun 07. See daily work sheets for details at Annex B. [Not 
made available]. 
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3.  CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
2 July:  
1300: [Name removed] reported to the MACC SL two items were located on CBU 771 during 
an [Demining Group] completions visit.  
1430: Site visit by investigation team 
1530: Investigation team departs site. 
7 July:   [Demining Group] internal investigation received at the MACC SL, see 
Annex A. 
27th Jul: Additional information regarding the incident was received by MACC SL regarding 
the clearance of the area where the items were located. 
30th Jul: 0700-1500:  [Demining Group] BAC Team 4 was interviewed regarding the site 
clearance, including Team Supervisor at [Demining Group] HQ. This was followed by a site 
visit to the CBU location.  
31st Jul: 1030-1300:  Follow up interview with PM [Demining Group] and Team 4 
Supervisor at [Demining Group] HQ. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
On 2nd Jul the [Demining Group] completed team reported that two items (M77 and M42) had 
been located in a sub surface cleared area during a final [Demining Group] completions visit 
before handing the site to the MACC. The items were located during the harvesting of a 
wheat crop by the local land owner.  
The area was clearly recorded as being cleared sub surface. 
The items were located on the surface. 
The area was not cleared sub-surface in accordance with the [Demining Group] SOPs or the 
NTSGs. 
The incident is therefore, considered as Preventable.  
5.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER ACTIONS 
The MACC SL investigation team agrees with the [Demining Group] internal investigation 
report ‘Para a” of the recommendations only and further recommends the following additional 
requirements are implemented with effect receipt this report: 
a.  [Name removed] “Operational Accreditation” to conduct BAC operations in South Lebanon 
is suspended, with immediate effect. In addition, due to the serious nature of the incident it is 
also recommended that [Demining Group] consider taking appropriate disciplinary action 
against [Name removed].  
Operational Accreditation to conduct BAC for [Demining group supervisor] in South Lebanon 
is suspended until an appropriate level of revision and re-training in clearance requirements 
has been completed. This is to included appropriate command and control requirements and 
the correct methods of conducting BAC clearance operations, in accordance with [Demining 
Group] SOPs and the NTSGs 
b.  [Demining Group] BAC Team 4, “Operational Accreditation, to conduct BAC operations in 
South Lebanon is suspended, with immediate effect.  
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Operational Accreditation to conduct BAC for [Demining Group] BAC Team 4 in South 
Lebanon is suspended until an appropriate level of revision and re-training in clearance 
requirements has been completed.   
c. The area in question is to be re-cleared using the appropriate sub-surface clearance 
procedures, in accordance with [Demining Group] SOPs and the NTSGs, until fade or the 
MACC Ops Officer confirms not additional clearance is required in this site.  
d. There is a further aspect to this incident in that not only did it happen but it was recorded in 
[Demining Group] daily worksheets without any internal comment such that the entire site was 
about to be presented for completion. This is considered as significant as the incident itself 
and that it is a reflection of poor internal management procedures and quality control. MACC 
SL expects [Demining Group] to take all necessary action to resolve this problem to avoid 
further similar problems in the future.  
Signed: [Three names removed]   UN MACC SL    
1st Aug 2007 
Enclosures: [Not made available] 
1. Annex A [Demining Group] Internal Investigation Report 
2. Annex B [Demining Group] Completion Reports 
3. Annex C [Demining Group] Team 4 witness Statements 
4. Annex D [Demining Group] Daily Work Sheets 
5. Annex E Site Photographs  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Management control Inadequacy because 
the investigators suspended accreditation from the demining groups involved because they 
had not ensured that their field managers acted in accordance with SOPs. An area was 
recorded as subsurface cleared and was not even visually searched. The record was made 
by the Field supervisor (accreditation also suspended), so the secondary cause is listed as a 
Field control inadequacy. 
The Inadequate investigation listed under Notes refers to the fact that the record appears to 
conflate two separate incidents in a way that is entirely confused. This is surprising because 
the outcome (suspension of working accreditation) was unusual and may have been subject 
to appeal, so the reasons for the action should have been carefully recorded.  
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